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A Critique of Recent Modelling Efforts to Determine the 
* 
Value of Human Life 
** Joanne Linnerooth 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to critically review the 
formulation and results of three recent models by Conley (1973), 
Usher (1973), and Jones-Lee (1974) each of which theoretically 
specifies what is popularly termed the "value of human life." 
A result common to each of these models is that this value 
can be calculated given sufficient information on personal 
consumption. Because of the importance of this result for the 
evaluation of public programs, regulations and policies which 
affect population mortality, the assumptions critical to its 
formulation will be carefully reviewed. 
The problem of evaluating risk to human life is part of 
a broader problem of the societal acceptance of large-scale 
technologies. A primary objective of the Joint IAEA/IIASA 
Research Project is to gain an improved understanding of how 
societies judge the acceptability of new technologies and how 
risk concepts can be incorporated into the decision-making 
1 process. Decisions which affect population mortality rates 
* 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect those of the Project Sponsors. 
**  
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Joint IAEA/IIASA Research Project, c/o International Atomic 
Energy Agency, P.O. Box 590, A-1011 Vienna, Austria. 
'~isk has been defined (Otway et al. , 1975) as a combination 
of event and consequence probability including the uncertainty of 
this probability. Generally the consequences are thought of as 
unfavourable, and the most unfavorable is the probability of 
human death. 
mortality rates are naturally the most difficult since in- 
evitably they require either an explicit or implicit evaluation 
of human life. Yet, since Schelling (1968) first suggested 
that such decisions need not be considered solely as moral 
questions and can be considered as practical questions, the 
idea of rationally allocating the resources of a society among 
lifesaving and other social objectives has become generally 
accepted. 
Rational analysis of social projects, where one of the 
impacts (or attributes of the consequences) can be described as 
lives potentially lost or saved, is often attempted by government 
or regulatory agencies. Such decisions were originally confined 
to those projects characterized by a limited number of impacts 
(e.g., questions of flood control, highway safety, etc.), but 
with the development of more sophisticated methods for evaluating 
societal decisions with multiple impacts or attributest2 such 
analysis is being attempted on much broader social problems. 
The work of the Joint Project on the evaluation of risk in- 
volving human life is thus an important input into the work 
of the IIASA Energy Project on the comparison of energy options. 
1.a Multiattributed Decision Analysis 
There are essentially three methods for choosing among 
options or projects where the consequences are characterized 
by multiple attributes. The first, sometimes referred to as 
the judgmental approach, involves a listing of the attributes 
of each consequence in vector form and allowing the decision 
2~ee, for example, the work of Pratt et al. (1965), and 
Raiffa (1968). 
3 ~ o r  a more complete review of these methodologies, see 
Baecher et al. (1975). 
maker to choose, based on his own judgment, what is the "best" 
option. Alternatively, the analyst can combine the attributes 
into a scalar measure of desirability by systematically expressing 
in commensurable units the desirability of each attribute . 4  A 
convenient unit of measure is money, and cost-benefit analysis, 
an established procedure for the evaluation of public programs, 
requires that all the benefits of the program be expressed in 
monetary units so that they can be compared with the cost . 5  The 
desirability of the consequences ofthe project can then be ex- 
pressed as a scalar value simply by summing the money values 
of each impact or benefit. However, such a procedure is 
limited to the evaluation of programs for which all of the 
impacts are preferentially independent, i.e., the desirability 
of any impact level is independent of the levels of the other 
impacts (Keeney and Raiffa, forthcoming). A third and more general 
methodology, sometimes referred to as the utility approach, 
accounts for possible interaction among the attributes. This 
methodology requires direct assessment of utility with the use 
of interview techniques which have been recently developed 
(Gros, 1974; Keeney, 1973; Keeney and Raiffa, forthcoming) and 
which are based on a set of axioms of individual behavior. 
4 ~ f  the objective of the decision maker is the well-being 
of the population, then this measure of desirability should 
reflect the preferences of the population. 
'A basic principle of cost-benefit analysis is that the 
marginal costs of providing lifesaving or safety should be 
equated with the marginal benefit. The marginal benefit of 
a program, if the objective of society is the maximization of 
total welfare or "utility," is measured by its contribution to 
total utility. However, the policy maker cannot make inter- 
personal comparisons of utility so it is impossible, in any 
true sense, for him to maximize total utility. But he can be 
guided in his decisions by what has been termed (Mishan, 1971) 
a Pareto improvement, or a policy which makes at least one 
person better off without making anyone worse off. The logic 
of the Pareto concept requires that programs which involve some 
increased or decreased chance of death should be evaluated by 
reference to what each member of the community is willing to 
pay or to receive for the estimated change in the risk. 
Under c e r t a i n  ve ry  s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  monetary 
approach of  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  program b e n e f i t s  
o r  consequences i s  comparable t o  t h e  u t i l i t y  approach.  There 
i s  a  u t i l i t y  b a s i s  t o  t h e s e  monetary v a l u e s  i . f  t h e y  r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  t o t a l  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  pay on t h e  p a r t  of  t h e  r e c i p i e n t s  o f  
t h e  ben e f i t . ,  i n  which c a s e  t h e  money v a l u e s  a r e  a  measure f o r  
changes i n  u t i l i t y  a t  t h e  margin. However, r ank ing  p r o j e c t s  
i n  terms of t h e  summation o f  t h e  agg rega t e  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  pay 
f o r  e ach  of  t h e  b e n e f i t s  i s  n o t  always comparable t o  rank ing  
them w i t h  t h e  u t i l i t y  approach.  According t o  Keeney and 
R a i f f a  ( fo r thcoming)  t h e  wi l l ingness - to -pay  approach i s  
j u s t i f i a b l e  o n l y  i f  
i. t h e  money a t t r i b u t e  t a k e n  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  any 
o t h e r  s i n g l e  a t t r i b u t e  i s  p r e f e r e n t i a l l y  
independen t  o f  t h e  o t h e r s ,  and 
ii. t h e  marg ina l  r a t e  of  s u b s t i t u t i o n  between money 
and any o t h e r  a t t r i b u t e  does n o t  f u n c t i o n a l l y  
depend on t h e  monetary l e v e l  [pp. 198,  1991 . 
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e y  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  t h e  wi l l ingness - to -pay  
approach does  n o t  a d e q u a t e l y  d e a l  w i t h  u n c e r t a i n t y  o f  t h e  
impact  o ccu r r an ce .  
1 . b  Def in ing t h e  Value o f  Human L i f e  
Recognizing t h a t  o n l y  under c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  can  
wi l l ingness - to -pay  be cons ide r ed  an  a p p r o p r i a t e  measure f o r  
t h e  p r e f e r a b i l i t y  o f  a n  a t t r i b u t e  o r  impact ,  w e  n e v e r t h e l e s s  
w i l l  d e f i n e  f o r  purposes  o f  t h i s  paper  t h e  "va lue  o f  human 
l i f e "  a s  t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  pay a t  t h e  margin f o r  changes  i n  
s u r v i v a l  p r o b a b i l i t y .  T h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  
terminology o f  t h e  Conley,  Usher,  and Jones-Lee models which 
h a s  been adopted f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  c o s t - b e n e f i t  p r i n c i p l e s  
t o  programs which a f f e c t  human m o r t a l i t y .  
Defining the value of human life as a probabilistic term 
represents a break in the traditional method of valuing life 
for purposes of evaluating public policies. The most common 
method has been to estimate the expected number of lives saved 
(or lost) and to value this benefit (or disbenefit) by 
aggregating the expected discounted earnings of each respective 
individual. This "human capital approach1' has been criticized 
by economists (e.g., Schelling, 1968) on the grounds that it 
ignores the individual's own desire to live and concentrates 
solely on society's ex post loss in GNP. Such a measure is 
not appropriate from the standpoint of economic welfare 
criteria which suggests instead that an appropriate measure 
should take into account each individual's ex ante desire to 
avoid the impending probability of death. Thus, programs 
affecting population mortality should be evaluated according 
to the change in the probability of survival for each relevant 
person since ex ante the impacts are known only probabilistically 
(it is almost never the case that a public program deals with 
identifiable individuals who will live or die with perfect 
certainty). This desire on the part of the individual to 
60riginally, the "human capital1' measure was calculated for 
purposes of estimating optimal life insurance (e.g., Woods and 
Metzger, 1927; ~ublin and Lotka, 1940); later, it served as an 
approximate measure for the ex post societal losses from accidents, 
diseases, etc. (e.g., Fisher, 1909; Reynolds, 1956; Weisbrod, 
1965) ; and finally, it has been adopted as an ex ante measure of 
benefits from lifesaving programs (e.g., Fromm, 1965; Lave and 
Seskin, 1970; Otway et al., 1971; White House Office of Science 
and Technology, 1972; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
1972). For this latter use, other suggested methods have been 
derivedfrom jury awards (Thedie and Abraham, 1961), from in- 
surance decisions (Fromm, 1965), and from implicit values from 
past political decisions on lifesaving (Morlat, 1970; Starr, 1969). 
For a survey of these methodologies, see Linnerooth, 1975. 
7 ~ n  practice, expenditures on lifesaving take two forms, the 
prevention of statistical deaths where the identity of the victims 
is not known (i.e., highway safety) and the rescue of identifiable 
persons in peril (i.e., kidney transplants). A theoretical treat- 
ment of these separate problems can be found in Linnerooth et al. 
(1975). 
increase his survival probability is conveniently valued in 
terms of his willingness to pay for this increase. 
Willingness-to-pay can be illustrated (Acton, 1973) by 
a very simple model of an individual's choice between consequences 
characterized by the attributes (alive, A, or dead, D) and 
lifetime consumption, C. (Instead of lifetime consumption, 
we could use alternatively wealth, W, or lifetime income, Y. 
But, for our purposes, we will assume that the three are 
equivalent.) Consider an individual who in a given period 
has a probability P of surviving and a probability (1-P) of 
dying. He can purchase an increase d in his survivial pro- 
bability by deducting an amount x from his lifetime consumption. 
The problem is to determine the individual's willingness to pay 
or that amount (x) which makes him indifferent between the 
following two lotteries: 
Lottery 1 
(A, C-x) 
(D, C-x) 
Lottery 2 
(I-B-1) 
It would be expected that willingness to pay varies as a 
function of the probability of death. It will be shown in the 
next section that under certain circumstances as this probability 
approaches one, willingness to pay approaches the infinite; yet, 
individuals willingly accept small nonsurvival probabilities for 
finite compensation. Figure I-B-1 illustrates one possible in- 
difference mapping where each curve represents a trade-off between 
lifetime consumption and survival probability. 
Fiaure I-B-1 
Since each point on the indifference curve represents 
equal satisfaction or utility, the slope of the curve represents 
the individual's willingness to pay to affect small changes in 
his survival probability. For example, referring to Fig. I-B-1, 
if the individual has initial consumption Co and survival pro- 
bability Po, he is willing to pay an amount x to increase his 
probability of survival by d. It is this trade-off x for dl or 
the slope of the indifference function, which has been defined 
(Hirshleifer et al., 1974) as the value of life appropriate 
for estimating the benefits of lifesaving programs. 8 
8~his definition, however, ignores the possibility of inter- 
dependent utilities or the willingness to pay on the part of 
other individuals in the society to extend the life expectancy 
of one of its members. It has been argued (Mishan, 1971) that the 
familial interest as well as society's general interest in re- 
ducing mortality rates is an important and probably inmeasurable 
factor. Yet, there is some economic justification for this ex- 
clusion if we assume that societal or familial interest are 
internalized in the individual's demand for his own life (an 
assumption which is implicit in most of welfare economics). In 
any case, the individual's demand for his life is most likely the 
?ominant factor, and the slope of this indifference function will 
for our purposes define the value of life. 
Empirically, it is very difficult to estimate willingness 
to pay for changes in survival probability. There are three 
possible methods. The first is to rely on market data and 
estimate, for example, the demand or necessary compensation 
to induce individuals to accept hazardous jobs (Thaler and 
Rosen, 1973). A second approach, originally suggested by 
Schelling (1968) and recently attempted by Acton (1973), is 
to rely on indirect questionnaire procedures. Unfortunately, 
neither approach has yielded definitive results primarily 
because of the host of extraneous variables which make it 
difficult to analyze market decisions and also because individuals 
find it difficult to give meaningful responses to questionnaires. 
A third and more indirect approach to determine an individual's 
preferences for increasing survival probability is to postulate 
specific behavioral axioms and objectives of the individual 
and by so doing theoretically reduce the problem to that of 
determining certain functional relationships. This is the 
approach of the three recent articles by Conley, Usher, and 
Jones-Lee. Each postulates a lifetime objective function 
depend&nt on lifetime consumption, and by assuming that the 
individual is an expected utility maximizer determines his 
rational behavior toward accepting decreased survival pro- 
bability. A result common to each of these models is that 
this behavior can be calculated with sufficient information 
on income utility. There is no need to obtain data on the 
types of decisions where the individual trades off income for 
life expectancy. Hirshleifer et al. (1974) further 
point out that this value is empirically correlated with the 
human capital approach of evaluating loss of life by calculating 
and d,iscounting to the present the individual's expected future 
earnings. 
The purpose of this paper is to critically review the 
formulation and results of these three models. Because of 
the similarity of this approach with the utility approach 
which has on one occasion been applied to this particular 
problem by Raiffa (1969), the two approaches will be compared. 
This paper will begin with a brief review of each of the three 
models including the Hirshleifer-Bergstrom-Rappaport interpretation. 
It will be established that the results are dependent upon 
somewhat weak assumptions regarding the individual's lifetime 
objective function. A more plausible specification of this 
objective function will result in a more complicated relation- 
ship between lifetime income and willingness to pay for in- 
creased expected longevity. A technique for determining this 
relationship has been developed in the aforementioned work by 
Raiffa which will be summarized in the last section. 
11. The Models of Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee 
2.a A' Brief Review 
The problem is to structure an individual's preferences 
for "lifesaving." Since death is inevitable, we can think 
of lifesaving as a probabilistic term for increase of life 
expectancy, and the demand for lifesaving as willingness to 
pay for these increases. Consider an individual who commences 
the current period with full information on his expected life- 
time. We candenote as pt his probability of surviving any 
given period, i.e., his age-specific mortality rate, and Pt 
as his probability of being alive in any given period. If 
pt occurs on the first day of the period, then Pt = Stpt 
where St is the probability of surviving until year t or 
- 
St - Pt-l ' Pt-2 I • I Po- It follows .that the demand for an increase 
in life expectancy can be expressed in terms of the demand for 
an increase in any age-specific mortality rate p t' This demand 
will likely depend on, among other things, the individual's 
current age or expected lifetime, his expected income, and 
the number of his dependents, as well as on the nature and 
timing of the probabilistic death. 
The models of Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee attempt to model 
this willingness to pay on the part of the individual for an in- 
crease in his own survival probability with the important assumption 
that the individual behaves as an expected utility maximizer. 9 
If a utility is assigned to each year of a person's life, then 
he behaves in such a way as to maximize his expected utility, 
or his total utility weighted by his probability of survival. 
In this way expected years of life enter the individual's life- 
time objective function indirectly as a weighting factor. The 
person is assumed to make a quantity-quality trade-off by 
purchasing increases in his survival probability with his income 
until he has maximized his expected utility. 
The analytics of the Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee models 
are straightforward and can best be reviewed by considering the 
problem in its simplest form. For this purpose we will assume 
that the individual is a lone bachelor; i.e., he has no family, 
friends, etc., who have an interest in his survival, thus 
eliminating the complication of interdependent utilities as well 
as any motive on the part of the individual to bequest his 
wealth. We will further assume that the individual regards his 
'~ifferent sets of axioms which imply that the individual 
maximizes expected utility are presented in von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947); Savage (1954); and Luce and Raiffa (1957). 
lifetime as fixed if he survives the initial period; i.e., he 
either does or does not live through the period. Whether or 
not he survives is determined on the first day when he faces 
- some probability of dying denoted 1 - Po(Po - po). Because 
the resolution is instantaneous, he suffers no anxiety. In 
addition, we will assume that the individual has a certain 
fixed sum of money which he will distribute throughout his 
lifetime. There are no opportunities for saving or investing 
(or for bequesting), so this sum of money can be regarded 
as lifetime consumption denoted C. (We will use upper case 
letters to refer to lifetime variables and lower case letters 
to refer to variables relevant to shorter periods of time, 
typically one year. ) 
To be consistent with the Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee, 
models, we will postulate an objective function in which the 
individual maximizes his expected lifetime utility expressed 
as a function of lifetime consumption. Since the individual 
begins the.initia1 period with a certain fixed amount of 
money to be considered lifetime consumption, this objective 
function can be written 
where E(U) represents expected lifetime utility, Po is pro- 
bability of surviving the current period, and U(C) is lifetime 
utility of lifetime consumption. The individual's tradeoff 
of lifetime consumption for survival probability can then be 
expressed 
where U' (C) represents the marginal lifetime utility of life- 
time consumption. Referring to Fig. I-R-1, we can see that 
equation 11-A-2 specifies the slope of the indifference 
function and is thus the value of life. Although this model 
is clearly too simple, it does illustrate the intuitive. As 
the probability of survival approaches zero, willingness to 
pay to increase this probability approaches infinity. 10 
2.a.l Jones-Lee's Model 
The models of Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee offer only 
slight variations to the above formulation. Jones-Lee 11 
introduces the possibility of a bequest motive in which case 
the individual, who again enters the current period with a 
certain amount of money or wealth, faces two contingencies: 
either he survives the period, in which case he and his de- 
pendents will enjoy his wealth, or he does not survive the 
period, in which case his dependents will enjoy whatever 
'AS Bergstrom (in Hirshleifer et al., 1974) has pointed 
out, this formulation resolves the paradox that an individual, 
although he likely places an infinite value on his own life, 
willingly accepts small probabilities of death for finite 
compensation. However, an infinite willingness-to-pay on the 
part of persons who face immediate and certain death has direct 
ramifications on the evluation of rescue programs. It leads to 
the second paradoxical result that society should (following 
the logic of willingness-to-pay) allocate far greater resources 
to rescue than to prevention or to programs which save persons 
facing certain death (i.e., persons in need of a kidney trans- 
plant) to those facing probabilistic death (i.e., automobile 
drivers). This leads us to question the slope of the in- 
difference function as an appropriate definition of the value 
of life. This is the topic of a forthcoming paper by this 
author. 
l1~ones-~ee develops theoretically Mishan' s (1971) concept 
of compensating variations for changes in the probability of an 
individual's own fatal accident. Compensating variations can 
be interpreted as either the amount of money necessary to fully 
compensate the individual for accepting some probability of death 
or the amount he, the individual is willing to pay to reduce 
some initial probability of death. 
portion of his wealth is bequethable. l2 The objective function 
can be written 
where U is the utility of wealth conditional on the state of A 
the world "alive" and UD(W) is the utility of wealth conditional 
on the state of the world "dead ." The maximization of E(U) 
is straightforward and results in the condition which we have 
defined as the value of life, or 
where UA' (W) and UD' (W) are the marginal lifetime utility and 
the marginal bequest utility with respect to wealth, respectively. 
This condition compares with equation 11-A-2, except as might 
be anticipated, a man's desire to leave a certain amount of 
his wealth to his dependents decreases his willingness to pay 
for his own safety. 
2.a.2 Conley's Model 
The models thus far have merely described the shape of the 
indifference function--"the tradeoff between immediate con- 
sumption and immediate hazard that would leave the individual 
in an equally preferred position, - if the infinitesimal changes 
in these variables (and only these variables) were imposed on 
him" (Rappaport, in Hirshleifer et al., 1974, p. 8 ) .  In 
contrast, Conley develops a model whereby consumption and sur- 
vival probability enter as behavioral variables. Describing 
12we now use the term wealth instead of consumption since 
we can no longer assume that the individual consumes all his 
monetary assets in his lifetime. 
his model as a "full information, competitive, zero transaction 
cost, no externalities (except for time of death) model of an 
individual's choices," he expresses the objective function 
whereby expected lifetime utility E(U) is separable into dis- 
counted single period utilities; u(e) is a single period utility 
function; p(.) is the probability of being alive; and X (t) is the 
utility discount function. Since our purpose is to establish the 
relationship between consumption and p(.), we will note only 
that both u(.) and p(.) are functions of all lifetime activities, 
including consumption. Thus, the single period utility function 
can be written 
for n activities denoted x in period t, and where xt is the 
vector of activities. An activity is called consumption if 
the individual must expend cash outlays, production, if it 
results in cash income, and neutral if neither. When there 
is no activity, i.e., xit = 0 for all i's, then the individual 
is no longer alive. The utility of the state "death" can be 
arbitrarily set at zero, or 
and therefore we can say that the utility is determinable up 
to a.multiple constant. Also, in Conley's model p(.) is a 
function of xt (along with several other important variables 
such as age, outside influences, etc.), and the objective 
function can be rewritten 
The i n d i v i d u a l  maximizes h i s  o b j e c t i v e  func t ion  o r  ex- 
pected u t i l i t y  s u b j e c t  t o  two c o n s t r a i n t s .  The f i r s t ,  a  
monetary c o n s t r a i n t ,  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  expected l i f e t i m e  con- 
sumption e q u a l s  expected l i f e t i m e  income p l u s  wea l th ,  o r  
where r i s  t h e  market r a t e  of  d i s coun t :  sit i s  t h e  monetary 
- 
va lue  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  each  u n i t  o f  xit such t h a t  sit > 0 when 
xit i s  a consumption a c t i v i t y  and sit < 0 when xit i s  pro- 
d u c t i v e ;  and W i s  weal th .  The second c o n s t r a i n t ,  t h e  t i m e  
c o n s t r a i n t ,  t a k e s  t h e  form 
where mit > .  0 r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  marginal  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  ( i f  any) of  
a c t i v i t y  i; and T i s  t h e  t o t a l  t i m e  a v a i l a b l e  i n  a per iod .  
To pu t  it i n  words, t h e  equ i l i b r ium c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  maximiza- 
t i o n  o f  11-A-8 s u b j e c t  t o  11-A-9  and 11-A-10 a r e  such t h a t  t h e  
marginal  u t i l i t y  o f  a c t i v i t y  i must equal  t h e  sum of  t h e  expected 
l o s s  o f  l i f e t i m e  u t i l i t y ,  t h e  marginal  u t i l i t y  o f  t h e  monetary c o s t  
and expected insurance  l o s s  (Conley i n c l u d e s  a t e r m  f o r  i n -  
surance cove rage ) ,  and t h e  marginal  u t i l i t y  of t i m e  used. 
From t h i s  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  Conley d e r i v e s  t h e  va lue  of  
human l i f e ,  L,  " a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  l i f e - s a v i n g  investments"  a s  
d i scounted  expec ted  l i f e t i m e  consumption d iv ided  by t h e  
e l a s t i c i t y  of d i scounted  l i f e t i m e  u t i l i t y  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  
l i f e t i m e  consumption 
which is consistent with our previous formulation given values 
of P close to unity. 
The relationship is verified by Conley by considering a 
state of technology such that all safety expenditures can be 
separated from all consumption expenditures. The individual 
maximizes 
where S is expenditure on safety; P(S) is the probability of 
surviving the current period; and C and Y are lifetime con- 
sumption and lifetime income, respectively. Maximizing expected 
utility {P(S)U(C)} subject to the budget constraint (Y = C + S) 
yields the following first-order condition: 
which is exactly equivalent to our previously derived value of 
life. 
Conley's verification equation 11-A-12 differs from his 
original objective function (equation 11-A-8) in two important 
ways. First, lifetime utility, expressed originally in terms 
of all lifetime activities, becomes a function of only con- 
sumption activities. Secondly, the verification model is, again, 
a one period analysis which avoids thus complications of dis- 
counting future utility. 
Usher's Model 
usher13 also formulates a multiperiod model, but avoids 
the controversial problem of discounting utility by expressing 
lifetime utility as a function of all past consumption. Total 
expected lifetime utility becomes 
n 
E(U) = RtUt ( C )  
t=O 
where Rt is the probability of living exactly t years; n is 
the maximum length of life; and Ut(C) is a function of con- 
sumption in each year in which the individual is alive, or 
Since 
where (1 - pt) is the mortality rate in year t and St is the 
probability of surviving until year t, then expected lifetime 
130sher is concerned with the problem from the point of 
view of developing social indicators which reflect an expanded 
concept of national welfare from the usual income or GNP 
measures. The inclusion of one such welfare change, decreased 
population mortality rates, requires some method of valuing or 
pricing these changes. For this purpose Usher develops a 
model of life cycle planning and inquires as to what role un- 
certain mortality plays. That is, what is worth to the indi- 
vidual in terms of foregone consumption to decrease his risk 
of dying in any given (present or future) period (s) ? 
becomes 1 4  
I f  w e  assume t h a t  l i f e t i m e  u t i l i t y  over  t y e a r s  i s  an 
15  a d d i t i v e  f u n c t i o n  o f  u t i l i t y  i n  each  y e a r ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  t h e  
weigh ts  a r e  e q u a l  t o  one,  o r  
14p ro f .  Mar t in  McGuire (Dept. o f  Economics, U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
Maryland) ha s  po in t ed  o u t  t o  m e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i n  
Usher ' s  f o rmu la t i on .  S ince  t h e  maximum l e n g t h  o f  l i f e  n  i s  
f i x e d ,  t h e n  t h e  sum o f  t h e  a g e - s p e c i f i c  m o r t a l i t y  r a t e s  (1 - pt )  
must be e q u a l  t o  u n i t y ,  i .e . ,  1 (1 - pt )  = 1. There fo re ,  i f  
t n  
A (pt  - 1) > 0, t h e r e  must be  a  compensating A (pt  - 1) < 0 
i = O  
(j # i) . Thi s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  Usher ' s  f o rmu la t i on  i g n o r e s  a  
neces sa ry  c o n s t r a i n t .  
1 5 0 r i g i n a l l y  Meyer (1969) and l a t e r  Keeney (1974) showed t h a t  
an  a d d i t i v e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  under c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  " t empora l l y  r i s k  n e u t r a l . "  I n  p a r t i c u l a r  Meyer 
assumes t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker ' s  l i k i n g  f o r  f u t u r e  consumption 
s t reams  i s  independent  o f  p a s t  consumption l e v e l s  and t h a t  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  maker ' s  l i k i n g  f o r  consumption i n  t h e  nea r  f u t u r e  i s  
independent  o f  h i s  consumption l e v e l s  i n  t h e  d i s t a n t  f u t u r e ,  
whatever t h o s e  l e v e l s  may be.  Meyer t hen  p roves  t h a t  a  p rope r  
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  f o r  l i f e t i m e  consumption s t reams  must be  e i t h e r  
t h e  sum o r  p roduc t  o f  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  f o r  consumption i n  each 
yea r .  There a r e ,  i n  f a c t ,  two produc t  forms, which w e  c a l l  t h e  
nega t i ve  p roduc t  form and p o s i t i v e  p roduc t  form. What d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  
t h e  two produc t  forms and t h e  sum form i s  a  p r o p e r t y  d i s cove red  
by Meyer, c a l l e d  temporal  r i s k  ave r s ion .  "Suppose t h e  d e c i s i o n  
maker h o l d s  a  l o t t e r y  de te rmin ing  t h e  n e x t  t e n  y e a r s '  consumption, 
which w i l l  be r e s o l v e d  independen t ly  f o r  each  of  t h e  nex t  t e n  
y e a r s .  Fur thermore ,  suppose t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  
between r e c e i v i n g  consumption $X f o r  c e r t a i n  i n  each  y e a r  and t h e  
l o t t e r y .  Now suppose t h a t  i n s t e a d  o f  independent  l o t t e r i e s  f o r  
then Usher's equation 11-A-17 can be rewritten 
where St = P ~ - ~  pt-* I . - . I pO. From equation 11-A-19 we can 
specify the individual's trade-off between consumption and 
survival probability for any period of his life.16 Considering 
only the initial period to conform to our simple model, we 
can write this trade-off 
l5 'Onto each of the ten years the lottery will only be 
resolved once and this single resolution determines the decision 
maker's consumption level for all ten years. If the decision 
maker will.accept less than $X for certain in each year in 
place of this single ten-year lottery then he is temporally 
risk averse and his utility must be of the negative product 
form (providing, of course, that he follows our other be- 
havioral assumptions). If he will still take $X for certain I 
in each year, then he is temporally risk neutral and his 
utility must be of the sum form. Finally, if his certainty 
equivalent is now more than $X per year, then he is temporally 
risk seekinq" [Richard, 1972, pp. 1-3.41. 
16~rom equation 11-A-14. Usher derives the trade-off between 
initial period consumption and the increase in survival pro- 
bability for any year t as 
The numerator in the above equationexpresses expected lifetime 
utility given that the individual survives the hazard of the 
initial period, compared to the numerator of equation 11-A-2 
which expresses known lifetime utility given the individual 
survives the hazard of the initial period. Again the value 
of life is expressed as a function of lifetime utility of 
lifetime consumption, in this case lifetime expected utility. 
2.b The Results 
An important result of the Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee 
models is the implied relationship betweenthevalue a person 
places on his life and his personal income or lifetime con- 
sumption. Conley states at the outset that he is interested 
in determining the "relationship between one's income and 
one's value of human life." According to his model this 
value is equal to a man's expected lifetime (discounted) 
consumption divided by his lifetime consumption elasticity 
of lifetime utility. In principle, the Usher and Jones-Lee 
models agree with this result. 
The significance of this result is that given an assumption 
on the form of an individual's consumption utility, the value 
of life can be calculated from data on personal consumption. 
As an illustration, Usher calculates this value from Canadian 
time-series data on net national product. Assuming a utility 
of consumption function common to economic analysis, or 
Usher is able to estimate values for Ut (C) (in the aggregate) 
by postulating a range of values for b and r, where l/b re- 
presents a measure for the degree of diminishing marginal 
utility of consumption and r is a subjective parameter repre- 
senting the degree of utility time-preference. By substituting 
this measure of Ut(C) into his derived value of life (equation 
11-A-20) and with data on age-specific mortality rates, Usher 
is able to estimate the value of life (in aggregate). For 
example, choosing r = 3 per cent and b = 50 per cent, the 
average value of life (in 1961) calculated by Usher was 
$91,000. (The values ranged from $1,331,000 (r = 1%; 
b = 5%) to $33,000 (r = 5%; b = loo%),) 
2.c The Hirshleifer-Bergstrom-Rappaport ( H I  B, and - R) 
Interpretation 
It is clear form the specifications of the Conley, Usher, 
and Jones-Lee objective functions that given no bequest motive, 
the utility of death is implicitly zero. H, B, and R go one 
step further and assumes that the utility of zero consumption 
is also zero U(0) = 0. "We now assume, as a special case, that 
death corresponds to an income of C = 0 - the person, when alive, 
considers death as the equivalent of an income of zero" (p. 26). 
He emphasizes the "special case" recognizing that most people 
are not indifferent between dying with zero income and dying 
with a positive income--in most cases there is a bequest motive. 
Given this assumption, H, B, and R analyze the individual's 
response to a risky project yielding a P chance of income C' 
and a Q = 1 - P chance of zero income. Since the utility of 
zero income is zero, the expected utility E(U) of this prospect 
can be expressed 
Postulating a cardinal utility of lifetime consumption, HI B, and R's 
interpretation of this prospect is illustrated in Figure 11-C-1. 
The utility function displays diminishing marginal utility, 
U' (c) < 0, and passes through the origin. 
Figure 11-C-1 
If the individual has a lifetime consumption of C ' ,  then the 
expected loss in utility from the hazardous prospect can be 
seen as L representing the difference between U (C' ) and E (U) . 
uf 
E (U) is simply P times U (C' ) . The monetary equivalent (the 
amount of money the individual must be compensated to restore 
him to his original utility position of U(C')), noted LC, is 
derived from the slope of the function and can be approximated 
for very small values of Q as 
Since LU = QU(C'), equation 11-C-2 can be rewritten 
Because q is the probability of zero consumption which represents 
in turn the probability of death, the other factor of the above 
equation, U(C' ) , represents, according to H, B, and R, the value 
dU/dC 
of life. Since this derivation is valid only for very low Q's 
or P - 1, this value is consistent with the value of life, 
, derived by Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee. 
111. A Critique 
From the last section we can conclude that the value of 
human life as formulated by Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee is 
formally similar and empirically correlated with the human 
capital measure. In fact, if Usher's special form of consumption 
utility is hypothesized, the value of life differs from life- 
time earnings only to the extent of diminishing marginal 
utility of lifetime consumption. 
This rather surprising relationship between what an indi- 
vidual is willing to pay to reduce some probability of in- 
stantaneous death and the individual's lifetime consumption is 
clearly dependent on the assumed objective functions of the 
three models. The only variable entering the individual's 
lifetime utility is assumed to be lifetime consumption (plus 
bequests in the Usher model). Lifetime consumption, according 
to Conley, is defined as total lifetime activities which incur 
positive monetary outlays. 1t appears then that this univariate 
treatment of lifetime utility focuses only on the more materialistic 
side of life. Yet, the univariate assumption is central to the 
arguments of Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee, and for this reason 
it is important to give it careful consideration. In particular, 
we will analyze the H ,  B, and R justification of this assump- 
tion. 
3.a The Hirshleifer-Bergstrom-Rappaport Justification of 
Univariate Lifetime Utility 
Consider once again HI B, and R's risky prospect where the 
individual faces a Q = 1 - P chance of losing his income C', 
expressed C ,  0; PI Q). We can recall that such a prospect, 
according to Hirshleifer's assumption that zero consumption 
means certain death, is equivalent to a risky prospect offering 
a Q = 1 - P chance of death and otherwise life at income C', 
expressed (C', Death; P, Q). In other words, given this 
assumption, the individual must be indifferent between the 
following two lotteries 
C = C' 
and 
Death 
where the first lottery represents a P chance of C = C' and a 
Q chance of C = 0, and the second lottery represents a P chance 
of C = C' and a Q chance of immediate death. This indifference 
follows, of course, from the fact that since C = 0 means death, 
the two lotteries are exactly equivalent. 
However, the problem arises when H, B, and R then con- 
clude that the utility (which can only be interpretedas life- 
time utility which we have denoted U) of the risky prospect to 
an expected utility maximizer is 
The reasoning seems to be as follows: since U (Death) = 0 and 
U(C = 0) = 0, then U (Death) = U(C = 0) which in turn implies 
that U = U(C). The last implication does not necessarily follow 
from the former, from H, B, and R's assumption (plausible under 
his special conditions) that U (Death) = U( (C = 0) . l7 yet, in 
order to express the lifetime utility of the risky prospect as 
PU(C1) in the above equation, it is necessary to assume that 
u = U(C). 
To appreciate further the fallacy of this reasoning, we will 
extend it to the case where the options are not zero consumption 
and death, but positive consumption and death. The two con- 
ditions necessary for HI B, and R's interpretation of the value 
of life are 1) that the individual maximizes expected utility, 
and 2) that U (lifetime) = U (lifetime consumption) or U = U(C). 
With these two assumptions it can easily be shown that, given 
constant marginal utility of consumption,18 the individual is 
also indifferent between the following two lotteries: 
17~nother problem, not discussed by Hirshleifer-Rappaport, 
is that the assumption of zero income being equivalent to death 
holds only in the aggregate. Rappaport writes that "...income = 0 
means that (the individual). would be starving, thirsting, and 
exposed to the elements; i.e., he would be dead soon anyway" 
(p. 15). But, in reality, most people do not view a total 
loss of their income or wealth, i.e., bankrupcy, as certaln 
death. This is then essentially an empirical matter-- will 
persons choose U = (C = 0) over U (Death)? 
18~rofessor Hirshleifer has pointed out to me that this 
indifference is less obvious with diminishing marginal utility 
of consumption. To make the point, it would be necessary to 
show that the necessary compensation (for indifference) is 
greater than the difference occurring only to diminishing 
marginal utility. However, with sufficiently small C, 
diminishing marginal utility is negligible. 
( 3  C,  L i f e )  ( 4  C ,  L i f e )  
(1 C ,  L i f e )  (Death)  
where C i s  some l e v e l  of  consumption g r e a t e r  t h a n  s u b s i s t a n c e .  
S e t t i n g  ag a i n  U (Dea th )  = 0, t h e  expec ted  u t i l i t y  o f  t h e  f i r s t  
l o t t e r y ,  (0 .5  ( 3 )  . U ( C )  + 0.5  . u ( c ) )  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  expec ted  
u t i l i t y  o f  t h e  second l o t t e r ,  0.5 ( 4 )  U ( C )  . However, w e  
would n o t  e x p e c t  t h e  av e r age  person t o  be i n d i f f e r e n t  between 
t w o  such  lo t t e r ies .  I t  c a n  be concluded t h a t  t h e  u n i v a r i a t e  
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  q u i t e  unappeal ing.  
3 .b  An A l t e r n a t i v e  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  L i f e t i m e  U t i l i t y  
W e  now t u r n  t o  r e c o n s i d e r  t h e  concep t  o f  l i f e t i m e  u t i l i t y  
which we have deno ted  U. W e  w i l l  beg in  by t a k i n g  a  second 
look a t  Conley 's .  model and r e i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  
which b o t h  H I  B ,  and R and C o n l e y , g i v e  t o  t h e  
r e s u l t s .  
W e  can  recal l  from e q u a t i o n  11-A-8 t h a t  Conley ' s  o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n  i s  
where xt i s  a  v e c t o r  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  p e r i o d  t. Conley c a l l s  
an  a c t i v i t y  consumption i f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  must expend c a s h  ou t -  
l a y s ,  p r o d u c t i o n ,  i f  it r e s u l t s  i n  c a s h  income, and n e u t r a l ,  i f  
n e i t h e r .  From e q u a t i o n  111-B-1 ,  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  d i s coun t ed  
l i f e t i m e  u t i l i t y ,  U,  i s  
If we denote the set of all activities which can be considered 
t 
consumption as c , the set of activities which are neutral or 
t 
nonconsumptive as n , and the set of all activities which are 
t t t  productive as b , then (assuming c , n , and bt are separable) 
equation 111-B-2 can be rewritten 
t t t  u =  l ~ ( t ) u ( c ,  n ,  b )  , (111-B-3) 
t 
t 
and lifetime consumption C is simply 1 c . The term U of 
t 
Conley's derivation of the value of human life (see equation 
can only be interpreted as total lifetime utility which is a 
function of both lifetime consumption activities C, non- 
consumption activities N, and production activities B. 
It is curious, then, that Conley interprets U as a function 
of C alone (see equation 11-A-12), deriving thus the following 
value of life 
which is determinable given sufficient information on the 
individual's utility of consumption or income. It seems that 
a more reasonable interpretation, given the original intent of 
Conley's model, would be to retain a relationship between the 
utility of living through a period and all activities of the 
period: Consumptive, productive, and neutral. Keeping our 
notation where C denotes lifetime consumption activities, 
N lifetime nonconsumption activities, and B lifetime pro- 
ductive activities, we can rewrite Conley's value of human 
life as 
where again U' (C,N,B) denotes the marginal lifetime utility of 
lifetime consumption. For P(S) very close to one the above 
equation can be expressed 
where again a represents the elasticity of lifetime utility with 
respect to lifetime consumption, but in this case U is a function 
of all activities. 
We now want to ask what difference the above derivation 
of the value of human life makes to the results of the Conley, 
Usher, and Jones-Lee models? In particular, in what direction 
does it affect the relationship, illustrated by HI BI and R ,  
between the willingness-to-pay method of valuing life (where 
- is willingness to pay) and the human capital method (dis- 
ap 
counted lifetime income)? 
H, B, and R's illustration of Conley's value of life is 
based on Conley's postulated relationship between consumption 
and lifetime utility. According to Conley, Figure 111-B-1 
presents the general case, in which a strictly concave lifetime 
utility function, with U' > 0, will have three regions. In the 
first U' < 0 and thus a < 0. In the second, U' > 0 but a > 1, and 
therefore L < C. In the third, which may be called the general 
case, 0 < a < 1, and L > C; that is, for a value of expected life- 
time consumption above some critical value where a =  1, the 
value of human life exceeds expected lifetime consumption. 
Fiqure 111-B-1 
We have shown Conley's lifetime utility as a function of 
nonconsumption and production activities as well as consumption. 
If for the sake of simplification we imagine that the utility 
of consumption activities, the utility of nonconsumption 
activities, and the utility of production activities are 
separable and additive, then we can redraw Conley's graph with 
an additive transformation of the curve. As such H I  B, and R's 
assumption that zero consumption is a state of zero utility or 
death represents simply a discontinuity in the curve. The 
relationship therefore between lifetime utility and lifetime 
consumption (assuming that C > 0 is subsistence) can be expressed: 
U = U(C) + U (N) + U (B) C > O  
(111-B-8) 
u = o  C S O  
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 111-B-2. 
Fiaure 111-B-2 
With this interpretation the elasticity of lifetime utility 
with respect to lifetime consumption a depends on the values of 
U (N) and U (B) as well as U (C) . As u (N) increases, u decreases-- 
thus confirming the intuitive notion that the higher the value 
an individual places on his nonmaterial (nonconsumption) life, 
the higher he values his life. 
The relationship between lifetime utility and lifetime 
activities (C and N) pictured in Figure 111-B-2 does not, 
of course, represent reality. We would expect a much more 
complicated relationship between lifetime utility and both 
consumption and nonconsumption activities. This relation- 
ship does, however, show the apparent fallacy in the reasoning 
of Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee when they postulate lifetime 
utility as a univariate function of lifetime consumption. We 
will recall that we can accept their hypothesis only if we are 
willing to accept that the individual is indifferent between 
lotteries 111-A-3. 
It remains to compare graphically this derivation with 
that of H, B, and R's. Figure 111-B-3 illustrates both 
H, B, and R's interpretation of Conley's value of life and our 
derivation or reinterpretation of this value. For purposes 
of comparison we assume, as did H, B, and R, that zero 
consumption represents zero utility or death. U(C), in 
Figure 111-B-3, represents the univariate utility which is 
assumed by Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee, and U represents the 
multivariate lifetime utility function which we have assumed 
to be an additive function of consumption, neutral, and production 
activities. U and U (C) are assumed parallel, the vertical 
distance between the two curves being U (N) and U (B) . U becomes 
discontinuous at C = 0, at which point U = 0. 
Figure 111-B-3 
0 C' - LC PC' r 0.5C1 
The lower part of Figure 111-B-3 is recognizable as 
H, B, and R's representation of Conley's value of life (see ' 
Figure 11-C-1). It can be easily seen from the upper part 
of Figure 111-B-3 that given our alternative interpretation 
of U, the HI B ,  and R derivation underestimates the value of 
life. Again, LU' represents the loss in expected utility, 
in this case U - .5 U, and L V C  represents the necessary 
compensation to restore the individual to his original 
level of utility. Depending on the value of U(N) and U(B) , 
L < Lnc, and therefore the Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee 
derivations underestimate the true value of life. 
We can conclude that the value of life can in no way be 
correlated with expected lifetime consumption unless the in- 
vestigator has, in addition, information on the utility of 
other variables making up lifetime utility. HI B, and R 
appear to recognize this limitation. Commenting on Usher's 
univariate specification of lifetime utility, they write: "This 
function gives no weight to the fact of death except as it 
means loss of potential consumption income .... No one has yet 
developed a utility function that captures the value of living 
per sen [p. 351. Yet, it seems that to ignore this "value of 
living per se" is to ignore the essence of the problem of 
deriving a value of life. 
IV. An Alternative Formulation 
We have shown in the previous section that the value of 
life measure derived by Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee is valid 
only if one is willing to accept that consumption is the only 
argument entering lifetime utility. If, on the other hand, 
one accepts Conley's original formulation of lifetime utility 
as a function of all activities--consumptive, productive, and 
neutral--then it follows that the value of life is a much more 
complicated relationship of both lifetime consumption and non- 
consumption activities. We have postulated lifetime utility 
as an additive function of U(C) and U (NC) , but to be realistic 
we would need, instead, to specify the many variables affecting 
lifetime utility and the interrelation of these variables with 
lifetime consumption--a process which is extremely complex. 
In addition, we would need to include an "anxiety" variable 
expressing the fears and anxieties associated with dying. 
"Dying" cannot be considered simply as the state of death. 
Economists do not, however, usually find it necessary to 
investigate all the variables (psychological and other) which 
enter into a utility function in order to determine demand. 
It is usually sufficient to postulate that the good provides 
utility to the consumer and then to analyze the relationship 
between the demand for the good and its price. If we apply 
this same reasoning to the demand for lifesaving, the value 
of life becomes essentially an empirical matter. The problem 
is to specify this demand for longevity or survival probability. 
Estimates could be made with appropriate data on market 
prices for personal safety measures. There has been one such 
attempt (Thaler and Rosen, 1973) in this direction, but the 
results are inconclusive primarily because of the host of 
extraneous variables which make it difficult to analyze 
market data. In light of these difficulties it has been 
suggested (Schelling, 1968) that a second approach might be 
to use questionnaire data. This method has also been questionned 
(Fromm, 1965) because individuals find it difficult to give 
meaningful responses to questions involving small probabilities. 
However, there has been at least one attempt (Acton, 1973) 
to use questionnaire data, and recently there has been much 
work (Raiffa, 1969; Keeney, 1974; Meyer, 1969) on developing 
questionnaire procedures for specifying preferences. 
The approach by Raiffa, which we will briefly present in 
this section, is part of more general procedure of ranking of 
preferences for multiattributed consequences appropriate for' 
making decisions under conditions of uncertain consequences. 
If expected utility can be considered an appropriate guide 
for decision making, then probabilistic outcomes ranked in 
terms of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility are sufficient for 
assessing decision problems. In this context Raiffa has been 
concerned with the specification of multiattributed utility 
or value functions and, in one case, the specification of 
preferences over the dual attributes, lifetime consumption, 
and survival probability. In this section we will discuss 
this line of research after a brief review of utility or 
preference theory. 
4.a A Review of Preference Theory 
- 
Preference theory, or utility theory, concerns itself with 
the quantification of an individual's judgment of the pro- 
bability, or value of various "goods. "I9 A utility function 
associates a numerical index with each of several possible 
goods reflecting their preferential ranking. There are two 
types of utility functions. The first, which is called an 
ordinal utility or value function, provides an ordering 
relation between well defined alternatives, e.g., different 
goods or commodity bundles, and therefore its meaning remains 
unchanged under order-preserving transformations. The second 
type of utility function, which was originally developed by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern and which we will refer to as 
19"~oods" in this sense, refers to the set of all possible 
alternatives--things, services, situations, outcomes, etc., 
with which we are concerned. 
N-M u t i l i t y ,  p r o v i d e s  an  o r d e r i n g r e l a t i o n  between outcomes 
which a r e  u n c e r t a i n ,  t h a t  i s ,  outcomes whose c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
a r e  n o t  d e f i n i t e ,  b u t  r a t h e r  d i s t r i b u t e d  acco rd ing  t o  a  pro-  
b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
A s imple  example (Oksman, 1974) i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
between o r d i n a l  and N-M u t i l i t i e s :  
L e t  L1 and L 2  be two outcomes cor responding  t o  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  x  assuming t h e  v a l u e s  x  = x  and x  = x  1 2  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I f  u ( x )  i s  a n  o r d i n a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
f o r  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  x ,  t h e n  el i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  L 2  
i f  u ( x l )  > u ( x 2 ) .  Any p o s i t i v e  monotone t r ans forma-  
t i o n  o f  u ( . )  p r e s e r v e s  t h i s  p r e f e r e n c e  s t r u c t u r e .  
However, i f  R1 and R 2  a r e  " l o t t e r i e s "  f o r  t h e  charac -  
t e r i s t i c  x  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  mass f u n c t i o n  p l ( x )  and 
p 2 ( x )  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  and o u r  d e c i s i o n  maker i s  " r a t i o n a l , "  
t h e n  -el i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  k 2  and o n l y  i f  
where t h e  symbol i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  x  i s  a  random 
v a r i a b l e  and E ( 0 )  r e f e r s  t o  e x p e c t a t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
When e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  t aken ,  e q u i v a l e n t  o r d i n a l  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  l e a d  t o  an  i d e n t i c a l  
p r e f e r e n c e  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  c e r t a i n  outcames. On t h e  
o t h e r  hand, any p o s i t i v e  l i n e a r  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  u  ( x )  
l e a d s  t o  t h e  i d e n t i c a l  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g  under un- 
c e r t a i n t y  a s  u ( x )  i t s e l f .  Thus, i f  u ( x )  is  t h e  N-M 
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l ,  t h e n  
v ( x )  = a  + b u ( x ) ,  b  > 0, i s  a l s o  a  v a l i d  N-M u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n  f o r  t h i s  i n d i v i d u a l ,  and t h e  two f u n c t i o n s  
a r e  s a i d  t o  be d e c i s i o n a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t .  Any f u n c t i o n  
which i s  n o t  a  p o s i t i v e  l i n e a r  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  u ( x )  
i s  n o t  an e q u i v a l e n t  N-P.1 u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  [pp. 7 , 8 ]  . 
One possible (although controversial) way of determining 
the preferences of an individual in order to specify his N-M 
utility function is to ask questions about indifference pro- 
babilities for certain types of lotteries. For example, if 
x* and x, are designed as the best and worst possible values 
of the outcome respectively, then supposedly the decision 
maker can find a probability, p(x), for an intermediary value 
of x such that he is indifferent between "x for sure" and a 
chance p (x) at x* with a completmentary chance {l - p (x)) at 
x,. This indifference value of x is called the certainty 
equivalent of the lottery. Diagrammatically we show this as 
By asking assessment questions for several values of x it is 
possible to establish a function (x) ranging from p(x,) = 0 
to p(x*) = 1. This function is a proper N-M utility and any 
positive linear transformation u(x) = a + bp(x) is a decisionally 
equivalent proper N-M utility. 
In many instances the possible outcomes of a decision problem 
are described by several characteristics inwhichcase we have 
a joint utility function which can be denoted U(xlfxZ,...,xn). 
The function U (xl , . . . , xk, . . . , xn) when viewed a s  a 
function of (xl, ... ,xk) with (X~+~,...,X ) held fixed is 
n 
also a proper utility function for ranking lotteries on 
(xl , . . . , xk) given value of (x k+l,...,xn). This is called a 
conditional utility function. I£ the decision maker can resolve 
lotteries on some subset of attributes, say (X lr...,xk) , 
irrespective of the value of ( x ~ + ~  , . . . ,xn) , then we can think 
of his marginal utility2' for (xl,.. . ,xk) ~arginal utility 
functions only exist if preferences between the different 
characteristics are independent in such a way as to permit 
appropriate decompositions of the joint utility. 2 1 
Raif fa's Derivation of U (C,P) 
Given this background, Raiffa considers the problem of 
assessing an N-M utility function over ,the dual attributes, 
lifetime consumption C and survival probability P. The 
problem, according to Raiffa, is greatly simplified if we can 
assume that this utility is an additive function of the dual 
attributes, C and PI or 
( IV-B- 1 ) 
where Xl and A2 are weighting factors. It has been proven 
(Fishburn, 1966) that a necessary and sufficient condition 
for additivity is that the individual's preferences depend 
only on the marginal probability distribution of each attribute. 
We can illustrate this assumption with a simple example. 
Suppose that the individual is faced with the two lotteries 
shown below: 
'O~his definition of marginal utility is different from the 
economists' concept which has been previously referred to in 
au this paper, namely - axi 
21For a good discussion of these concepts, see Oksman 
(1974). 
where C, < C and P, < P. If there is any complementarity between 
C and PI we would not expect that the individual be indifferent 
between the two lotteries because they offer different prizes. 
However, if his utility function is additive, and the marginal 
utility functions for C and P are Uc (C) and U (P) respect-ively. 
P 
then 
( IV-B- 3 ) 
and, therefore 
If we substitute various values of C and P into lotteries 
IV-B-2, it becomes apparent that most individuals would be 
indifferent between !L1 and R2 only for very high values of 
P. Thus, to assume additivity, we must constrain our analysis 
to very small nonsurvival probabilities. (It can be recalled 
Section II-A --that Conley also analyzed the low probability 
case with the justification that most relevant decisions fall 
within this range.) For a range of P's over which additivity 
does hold and by the assumed existence of a continuous utility 
function U (C,P) we can express IV-B-4 as 
If we let P, = 0 and arbitrarily set U(C,,P,) = 0, then 
by substitution we get 
U(C,P) = X1UC (C) + X u (P) 
2 P ( IV-B- 6 ) 
where the X's represent weighting factors and U (C) and 
C 
U (P) represent, again, the marginal utility function, or 
P 
u(c,P,) and U(C,,P), respectively. 
The problem now becomes one of specifying the marginal 
utility functions, Uc(C) and Up(P). It is easily shown 
(Raiffa, 1969, p. 88) that, given no anxiety, U (P) must be 
P 
linear with respect to P. This follows from the nature of the 
units on P. 2 2  If we normalize this utility, letting U (P,) = 0 
P - 
and U (P = 1) = 1, then 
P 
Substituting IV-B-7 into IV-B-6 
U(C,P) = AIUc (C) + h2P . 
Since an N-M utility function is only meaningful up to a linear 
transformation, IV-B-8 can be expressed in the form 
where 6 > 0. The critical parameter B can, according to 
Raiffa, be estimated given two points on the individual's 
indifference function. If 
2 #2 
To illustrate with an example, if the survival probability 
P depends on whether a given event turns out H or T with equal 
probabilities P1 and P2, then the probability of survival from 
the gamble must be (P1 + P2)/2. 
Raiffa concludes that in order to assess U(C,P), where we 
are willing to assume additivity and where there is no anxiety, 
we merely have to assess auti1i.t~ function for consumption 
(with some constant probability of survival) and find two 
(C,P) pairs over which the individual is indifferent. The 
derivative of this function, then, represents according to our 
definition the value of life. 
4.c Comparing Raiffa's Derivation with that of Conley, 
Usher, and Jones-Lee 
Because of the similarities between the Raiffa assumptions 
and those of Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee, it is interesting 
to compare the results. In general, the models address the 
case of the expected utility maximizer who has no family, 
dependents, etc., and who faces a beginning of the period 
probability of death. What distinguishes the Raiffa analysis 
form that of Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee is that Raiffa 
ac 
specifies U(C,P) and thus - by asking the type of 
ap 
questions which directly specify this trade-off (assuming) 
additivity, he need only find two points). On the other 
hand, Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee qualify this trade-off 
indirectly by specifying the demand for survival probability 
as the demand for "life." In other words, in the Conley, 
Usher, and Jones-Lee models the probabilityof survival P 
has no direct utility U(P) as in the Raiffa case; preferences 
over P can be assessed only as an expected value, PU (life), 
which is simplified to PU(C), and thus for the expected 
utility maximizer one needs to assess U(C). The Raiffa 
analysis circumvents this problem of specifying a utility 
of life. By taking the derivative of IV-B-7, we can formulate 
Raiffa's value of life as 
We can estimate B ,  in turn, by isolating two (C,P) points 
over which the individual is indifferent. Indirectly, the 
individual by specifying these preferences, assesses his 
utility of living. This is in contrast to the Conley, Usher, 
and Jones-Lee analysis where we need only assess the utility 
of consumption. 
V. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to critically review 
the results of the Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee models as 
they relate to the theoretical specification of the value 
of human life. This value has been defined as the willingness 
of an individual to pay for changes in his survival probability 
and it is graphically represented as the slope of the individual's 
indifference curve between survival probability and income or 
consumption. It has been shown that, in principle, the 
formulations of the three models are equivalent, and that the 
value of life can be expressed as the individual's lifetime 
utility of lifetime consumption divided by his initial period 
survival probability times the marginal utility of his life- 
time utility with respect to his lifetime consumption, or 
a c u (c) 
- = -- 
pout (C) . Iiirshleifer, Bergstrom, and Rappaport have aP 0 
pointed out that this value is formally similar to the tradi- 
tional human capital measure; in fact, if it can be assumed 
that U (C) = c', then the human capital measure understates 
the value of life by the degree of risk aversion or 1/8. 
The importance of this formulation is that it is relatively 
simple to estimate. One need only determine empirically a 
lifetime utility function. 
This surprising result is precluded by the form of the 
assumed objective function; in the case of all three models 
this objective function or lifetime utility is an univariate 
function of consumption. If one factors is an ad-juskment to 
this utility to account for the value of living independent 
of the value of being alive to consume, then the value of 
life turns out to be understated in the Conley, Usher, and 
Jones-Lee formulations. The seriousness of this understate- 
ment depends on the extent to which the utility of life is 
greater than the utility of lifetime consumption. 
Rejecting the Conley, Usher, and Jones-Lee hypothesis 
that the value of life is correlated solely with lifetime 
income, the problem becomes empirical. It is necessary to 
obtain data on the individual's trade-off between survival 
probability and income. One possible approach, although 
controversial, is to specify these choices with the use of 
questionnaire data. Raiffa, in the context of specifying 
preferences for decision analysis, develops an approach which 
is applicable to this problem. He shows that for very low 
nonsurvival probabilities it is necessary to isolate only 
two points of the individual's preference function and obtain 
information on the individual's utility of consumption. From 
this data, the entire preference function over the relevant 
range of survival probabilities can be specified and thus the 
value of life can be calculated over this range. 
However, one must be reminded t h a t  t h i s  s o l u t i o n  i s  de- 
pendent  on s e v e r a l  somewhat r e s t r i c t i v e  assumpt ions  (no 
dependents ,  immediate p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  dea th ,  e tc . )  and, i n  
p r a c t i c e ,  cannot  be g e n e r a l i z e d .  I t  i s  a l s o  impor tan t  t o  
n o t e  t h a t  one cannot  assume t h a t  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  
f o r  s u r v i v a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  i d e n t i c a l  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  
of  a c c i d e n t s  o r  c ause s  of  dea th .  Usua l ly  d e a t h  i s  accompanied 
by p e r i o d s  o f  "pa in  and s u f f e r i n g , "  and t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
pe r cep t i on  o f  d e a t h  i s  i n f l uenced ,  a s  w e l l ,  by a  m u l t i t u d e  
o f  p sycho log i ca l  f a c t o r s .  Pahner (1975) h a s  sugges ted  
t h a t  t h e s e  psycholog ica l  f a c t o r s  a r e  a  p o s s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  
f o r  what appears ,  i n  l i g h t  of  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  e s t i m a t e s  of  
t h e  r i s k ,  t o  be an  i r r a t i o n a l  r e a c t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of  t h e  
p u b l i c  t o  t h e  accep tance  o f  n u c l e a r  power p l a n t s .  An i m -  
p o r t a n t  f e a t u r e  o f  p r e f e r ence  f u n c t i o n s ,  however, i s  t h a t  
t h e y  do a l l ow  f o r  t h e  p sycho log i ca l  f a c t o r s .  To quo t e  
Mishan (SCOPE, 1975 ) :  " I f ,  f o r  example, a  pe rson  c o s t s  
t h e  r i s k  o f  d e a t h  i n  an  a u t o  a c c i d e n t  a s ,  s ay  $100,000 and 
c o s t s  i n  t h e  same r i s k  of  d e a t h  through a  n u c l e a r  power 
p l a n t  a c c i d e n t  as,  s a y  $1,000,000, t h e  economist  a c c e p t s  
i t "  (p.  5 ) .  
The major problem w i t h  t h e  wi l l ingness - to -pay  o r  pre-  
f e r e n c e  approach i s  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  e m p i r i c a l  e s t i m a t i n g  
a problem r e l e v a n t  t o  any d e c i s i o n  t echn ique  which r e q u i r e s  
t h a t  t h e  d i s b e n e f i t  of r i s k s  a f f e c t i n g  human m o r t a l i t y  be 
q u a n t i f i e d .  The model l ing approach t o  t h i s  problem, f o r  
r ea sons  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  paper ,  i s  l i m i t e d .  However, t h e r e  
a r e  p r e s e n t l y  some promis ing e f f o r t s  on t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  
t h e s e  p r e f e r e n c e s  w i t h  t h e  use  of  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s .  The 
so ' l u t i on  t o  t h i s  problem w i l l  be an  impor tan t  i n p u t  i n t o  t h e  
work of  t h e  IIASA Energy P r o j e c t  on t h e  comparison of  energy  
o p t i o n s .  
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